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1. Introduction 
The relationship between the growth rate of a quantifiable phenomenon and its 
initial size is a question with a long history in statistics: do larger entities grow more 
quickly or more slowly? By contrast, perhaps no relationship exists and the rate is 
independent of size. A fundamental contribution to this debate is that of Gibrat (1931), 
who observed that the distribution of size (measured by sales or the number of 
employees) of firms could be approximated well with a lognormal, and that the 
explanation lies in the growth process of firms tending to be multiplicative and 
independent of their sizes. This proposition became known as Gibrat’s law and 
prompted a deluge of work exploring the validity of this law in relation to the 
distribution of firms (see the surveys by Sutton (1997) and Santarelli et al. (2006)). 
Gibrat’s law states that no regular behaviour of any kind can be deduced between 
growth rate and initial size. The fulfilment of this empirical proposition also has 
consequences for the distribution of the variable; in the words of Gibrat (1931): “The 
Law of proportionate effect will therefore imply that the logarithms of the variable will 
be distributed following the (normal distribution).”
In the field of urban economics, Gibrat’s law, especially since the 1990s, has 
given rise to numerous empirical studies testing its validity for city size distributions, 
arriving at a majority consensus, although not absolute at all, that it explains the growth 
of cities relatively well and tends to hold in the long term. This has yielded theoretical 
works explaining the fulfilment of Gibrat’s law in the context of external urban local 
effects and productive shocks, associating it directly with an equilibrium situation. 
These theoretical models include those of Gabaix (1999), Duranton (2006, 2007) and 
Córdoba (2008). 
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Returning to the empirical side, there is an apparent contradiction in these 
studies, because they usually accept the fulfilment of Gibrat’s law but at the same time 
claim that the distribution followed by city size (at least the upper tail) is a Pareto 
distribution, which is very different from the lognormal. Eeckhout (2004) was able to 
reconcile both results by demonstrating (as Parr and Suzuki (1973) claimed in a 
pioneering work) that, imposing size restrictions on the cities, taking only the upper tail, 
this biases the analysis. Thus, if all cities are taken, it can be found that the true 
distribution is lognormal, and that the growth of these cities is independent of size. 
However, to date, the studies by Eeckhout (2004) and Giesen et al. (2010) are the only 
ones to consider the entire city size distribution. Nevertheless, these are short-term 
analyses,1 and the phenomenon under study (Gibrat’s law) is a long-term result (Gabaix 
and Ioannides, 2004). 
The aim of this work is to test empirically the validity of Gibrat’s law on the 
growth of cities, using data on the complete distribution of cities (without size 
restrictions) in three countries (the US, Spain and Italy) for the entire twentieth century. 
Our results qualify this study as the most comprehensive empirical examination of 
Gibrat’s law to date, considering the number of cities (un-truncated settlement size data 
from three countries), the long time span (a whole century) and the different 
methodologies that we apply (parametric and nonparametric techniques).  
Furthermore, the three countries selected give us information about two different 
urban behaviours. The US is an extremely interesting country with which to analyse the 
1 Eeckhout (2004) took data from the United States censuses of 1990 and 2000, possibly because they are 
the only ones to be available online. Levy (2009), in a comment to Eeckhout (2004), and Eeckhout (2009) 
in the reply, also considered no truncation point, but only for the 2000 US census data. Giesen et al. 
(2010), based on the pioneering work of Reed (2002), fitted the double Pareto lognormal (DPLN) and 
lognormal distributions to data from eight countries (Germany, France, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Italy, Switzerland, Brazil and the US). The data for the US were the same as those used by Eeckhout 
(2004, 2009) and Levy (2009). It should be noted that the DPLN also builds on Gibrat’s law, particularly 
a generalized version of the law (Reed, 2002). 
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evolution of urban structure because it is a relatively young country whose inhabitants 
are characterised by high mobility. By contrast, the European countries have a much 
older urban structure and their inhabitants present greater resistance to movement; 
specifically, Cheshire and Magrini (2006) estimate mobility in the US to be 15 times 
higher than that in Europe. Spain and Italy have a consolidated urban structure and new 
cities rarely appear (the foundation of many European cities dates back to the Middle 
Ages, so urban growth is produced by population increases in existing cities). In the US, 
however, urban growth has a double dimension: as well as increases in city size, the 
number of cities also increases, with potentially different effects on city size 
distribution.
The following section offers a brief overview of the literature on Gibrat’s law for 
cities and the results obtained. Section 3 introduces the databases. From our results, we 
deduce that panel data unit root tests tend to confirm the validity of Gibrat’s law in the 
upper-tail distribution (section 4.1). In section 4.2, we consider the entire distribution 
and, using nonparametric methods, we find that Gibrat’s law does not hold exactly in 
the long term (in general, size affects the variance of the growth process but not its 
mean). The validity of the law in the short term (by decade) is even weaker. In section 
5, we test whether the lognormal distribution is a good description of city size 
distributions across the entire century. The work ends with our conclusions. 
2. Gibrat’s law for cities: an overview of the literature 
In the 1990s, numerous studies began to appear that empirically tested the 
validity of Gibrat’s law. Table 1 shows the classification of all the studies on urban 
economics that we know of to date. The countries considered, statistical and 
econometric techniques used and sample sizes are heterogeneous, although Table 1 
shows that most of the recent empirical works have chosen between two techniques to 
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test for Gibrat’s law: panel unit root tests to consider a small sample size and 
nonparametric kernel regressions when the sample size is large. We apply these two 
methodologies in section 4. The results are fairly mixed, with the acceptance of the law 
the predominant outcome, albeit by a slight margin. 
Both Eaton and Eckstein (1997) and Davis and Weinstein (2002) accept its 
fulfilment for Japanese cities, although they use different sample sections (40 and 303 
cities, respectively) and time horizons. Brakman et al. (2004) come to the same 
conclusion when analysing the impact of bombardment on Germany during the Second 
World War, concluding that, for the sample of 103 cities examined, bombing had a 
significant but temporary impact on post-war city growth. Nevertheless, nearly the same 
authors in Bosker et al. (2008) obtain a mixed result with a sample of 62 cities in West 
Germany: correcting for the impact of the Second World War, Gibrat’s law is found to 
hold only for about 25% of the sample. Giesen and Südekum’s (2011) recent work 
cannot formally reject Gibrat’s law for the 71 largest German cities in 1997. 
Meanwhile, both Clark and Stabler (1991) and Resende (2004) also accept the 
hypothesis of proportionate urban growth for Canada and Brazil, respectively. The 
sample size used by Clark and Stabler (1991) is tiny (the seven most populous Canadian 
cities), although the main contribution of their work is to propose the use of data panel 
methodology and unit root tests in the analysis of urban growth. Resende (2004) applies 
the same methodology to his sample of 497 Brazilian cities. However, Henderson and 
Wang (2007) strongly reject Gibrat’s law and a unit root process in their worldwide data 
set on all metro areas over 100,000 inhabitants from 1960 to 2000. 
For the case of the US, there are also several works that statistically accept the 
fulfilment of Gibrat’s law, whether at the level of cities–Eeckhout (2004) is the first to 
use the entire sample without size restrictions and González-Val generalises this 
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analysis for the entire twentieth century–or with Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) 
(Ioannides and Overman (2003), whose results reproduce Gabaix and Ioannides (2004)). 
Also for the US, however, Black and Henderson (2003) reject Gibrat’s law for any 
sample section, although their database of MSAs differs2 from that used by Ioannides 
and Overman (2003). Michaels et al. (2012) use data from Minor Civil Divisions and 
counties to track the evolution of populations across both rural and urban areas in the 
United States from 1880 to 2000, finding that Gibrat’s law is a reasonable 
approximation for population growth only for the largest units. 
Other works exist that reject the fulfilment of Gibrat’s law. Thus, Guérin-Pace 
(1995) finds that in France, using a wide sample of cities with over 2,000 inhabitants 
during the period 1836–1990, there seems to be a fairly strong correlation between city 
size and growth rate, a correlation that is accentuated when the logarithm of the 
population is considered. This result opposes that obtained by Eaton and Eckstein 
(1997) when considering only the 39 most populated French cities. Petrakos et al. 
(2000) and Soo (2007) also reject the fulfilment of Gibrat’s law in Greece and Malaysia, 
respectively. For the case of China, Anderson and Ge (2005) obtain a mixed result with 
a sample of 149 cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants: Gibrat’s law seems to describe 
well the situation prior to the Economic Reform and One Child Policy period, but later 
Kalecki’s reformulation seems to be more appropriate. 
What we wish to emphasize is that, with the exception of Eeckhout (2004), 
Giesen et al. (2010) and González-Val (2010), none of these studies considers the entire 
distribution of cities, because all of them impose a truncation point, whether explicitly 
by taking cities above a minimum population threshold or implicitly by working with 
2 The standard definitions of metropolitan areas were first published in 1949. This means that if the 
objective is to make a long-term analysis, it will be necessary to reconstruct the areas for earlier periods, 
in the absence of a single criterion. 
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MSAs.3 This is usually because of practical reasons regarding data availability. 
Consequently, most studies focus on analysing the most populous cities, the upper-tail 
distribution. However, any analysis using this kind of sample will have a local character 
because the behaviour of large cities cannot be extrapolated to the entire distribution. 
This type of deduction can lead to biased conclusions, because it must not be forgotten 
that what is being analysed is the behaviour of a few cities, which in addition to being 
of a similar size can present common patterns of growth. Therefore, we might conclude 
that Gibrat’s law holds when in fact we have focused our analysis on a group of cities 
that cannot be representative of all urban centres. 
3. Databases 
We use un-truncated settlement size data from three countries: the US, Spain and 
Italy.4 Our database includes decennial census data for each decade of the twentieth 
century.5 Table 2 shows the number of cities for each decade and the descriptive 
statistics.
The data for the US are the same as those used by González-Val (2010). Our 
base, created from the original documents of the annual census published by the US 
Census Bureau, www.census.gov, consists of the available data of all incorporated 
places without any size restriction for each decade of the twentieth century. The US 
Census Bureau uses the generic term incorporated place to refer to a governmental unit 
incorporated under state Law as a city, town, borough or village, which has legally 
3 In the US, to qualify as an MSA a city needs to have 50,000 or more inhabitants, or the presence of an 
urbanised area of at least 50,000 inhabitants, and a total metropolitan population of at least 100,000. In 
other countries, similar criteria are followed, although the minimum population threshold required to be 
considered a metropolitan area may change. 
4 We use data from “legal” cities. However, there are problems involving international comparability 
because the administrative definition of a city changes from one country to another. Nevertheless, the 
concepts of municipality used in Spain and Italy are similar. 
5 No census exists in Italy for 1941 because of its participation in the Second World War, so we have used 
the data for 1936. 
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established limits, powers and functions. Incorporated places in Alaska, Hawaii and 
Puerto Rico are excluded because of data limitations. 
The alternative would be the use of metropolitan areas’ data. Both units have 
advantages. As Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) indicate, metro areas represent urban 
agglomerations, covering huge areas that are meant to capture labour markets. 
Metropolitan areas are attractive because they are more natural economic units. Legal 
cities are political units that usually lie within metropolitan areas, and their boundaries 
make no economic sense, although some factors, such as human capital spillovers, are 
thought to operate at a very local level. Furthermore, Eeckhout (2004) argues that there 
are statistical reasons that justify the use of incorporated places (un-truncated data) 
rather than metro areas.  
The percentage of the total US population that our sample of incorporated places 
represents can appear low compared with other studies using MSAs. The population of 
incorporated places increases from representing less than half the total population of the 
US in 1900 (46.99%) to 61.49% in 2000, while the number of cities increases by 
82.11% from 10,596 in 1900 to 19,296 in 2000. However, it is similar to that of other 
works using cities.6 The population excluded from the sample is what the US Census 
Bureau calls population not in place. Incorporated places do not cover the whole 
territory of the US. Some territories are excluded from any recognised place. For 
example, more than 74 million people (26.64% of the total US population) lived in a 
territory that, at least officially, was not in a place in 2000.7 Most of these people 
(61.58% in 2000) are rural population. 
6 For example, see Kim (2000) and Kim and Margo (2004), who define a city as an area having a 
population of greater than 2,500 inhabitants. 
7 Census 2000 data on the population in places and not in places can be found in Table 9 of PHC-3 (US 
Summary, part 1), available online at: http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/index.html.
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Although these people living outside incorporated places are excluded from our 
sample, they are included in some MSAs because these are multi-county units and this 
population is counted as inhabitants of the counties. MSAs cover huge geographic areas 
and include a large proportion of the population living in rural areas. This explains why 
the percentage of the total population represented by MSAs is higher than our sample of 
incorporated places. However, despite the sample of incorporated places covering a 
lower percentage of the total US population, the population of incorporated places is 
almost entirely urban (94.18% in 2000) compared with 88.35% of the urban population 
in the MSAs. 
For Spain and Italy, the geographical unit of reference is the municipality. The 
data come from the official statistical information services. In Italy, this is the Istituto 
Nazionale di Statistica (www.istat.it), and for Spain our source is the censuses by the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística,8 (INE, www.ine.es).
Municipalities are the smallest spatial units (local governments), thus they are 
the administratively defined “legal” cities. The main difference between these 
municipalities and the incorporated places is that municipalities are the lowest spatial 
subdivision in Spain and Italy, so they represent the whole territory of the country. 
Municipalities comprise the total land area, and therefore all the population too (see 
Table 2). However, in the US, a large amount of land area and population is not 
included in any place, as noted before. 
Figure 1 displays the mean growth rates for each decade weighted by city size, 








SSg , where itS  is the 
8 The official INE census has been improved in an alternative database, created by Azagra et al. (2006), 
reconstructing the population census for the twentieth century using territorially homogeneous criteria. 
We have repeated the analysis using this database and the results are not significantly different, so we 
chose to presente the results deduced from the official data. 
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population of the city i  in the year t . In the US, it can be observed that the first decades 
of the century saw strong growth rates for city sizes. However, this period of growth 
ended in 1920–1930. Between 1930 and 1970, the growth rates rise and fall, and then 
rise again in the last two decades. The two periods of lowest growth, 1930–1940 and 
1970–1980, are very close to two profound economic crises (the Great Depression and 
the second oil supply shock in 1979). Spain and Italy present lower growth rates; since 
the overall population did not fall in these countries in any decade, the declines in 
growth rates are related to composition effects: many small municipalities tend to shrink 
while the few large ones grow, in such a way that the weighted average decreases. The 
decline in growth rates at the end of the century in Spain and Italy is a consequence of 
the suburbanization process that took place in both European countries.
4. Testing for Gibrat’s law 
4.1. Parametric analysis: panel unit root testing 
Clark and Stabler (1991) suggest that testing for Gibrat’s law is equivalent to 
testing? for the presence of a unit root. This idea is also emphasized by Gabaix and 
Ioannides (2004), who expect “that the next generation of city evolution empirics could 
draw from the sophisticated econometric literature on unit root.”. In line with this 
suggestion, most studies now apply unit root tests (see Table 1). 
Some authors (Black and Henderson, 2003; Henderson and Wang, 2007; Soo, 
2007) test the presence of a unit root by proposing a growth equation, which they 
estimate using panel data. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) 
and Bosker et al. (2008), this methodology presents some drawbacks. First, the 
periodicity of our data is by decades, and we have only 11 temporal observations 
(decade-by-decade city sizes over a total period of 100 years), when the ideal would be 
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to have at least annual data. Second, the presence of cross-sectional dependence across 
the cities in the panel can give rise to estimations that are not very robust. It has been 
well established in the literature that panel unit root and stationarity tests that do not 
explicitly allow for this feature among individuals present size distortions (Banerjee et 
al., 2005). 
For this, we use one of the tests especially created to deal with this question: 
Pesaran’s (2007) test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels with cross-section 
dependence is calculated based on the CADF statistic (cross-sectional ADF (see below) 
statistic). To eliminate cross-dependence, the standard Dickey–Fuller (or Augmented 
Dickey–Fuller (ADF)) regressions are augmented with the cross-section averages of 
lagged levels and first-differences of the individual series, such that the influence of the 
unobservable common factor is asymptotically filtered. 
The test of the unit root hypothesis is based on the t-ratio of the OLS estimate of 
ib  in the following cross-sectional augmented DF (CADF) regression: 
ittititiiiit eydycybay ??????? ?? 11, ,  (1) 
where ia  is the individual city-specific average growth rate and ty  is the cross-section 





1 . We will test for the presence of a unit root in the natural 

















; from a long-term temporal perspective of steady-state 
distributions, it is necessary to use a relative measure of size (Gabaix and Ioannides, 
2004). The null hypothesis assumes that all series are nonstationary, and Pesaran’s 
CADF is consistent under the alternative that only a fraction of the series is stationary. 
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However, the problem with Pesaran’s test is that it is not designed to deal with 
such large panels (22,078 cities in the US, 8,077 in Spain and 8,100 in Italy), especially 
when so few temporal observations are available ? ?11, ??? TN . For this reason, we 
must limit our analysis to the largest cities (although the next section offers a 
nonparametric analysis of the entire sample).9
As noted previously in the literature review in section 2, traditionally most 
studies focus only on the upper-tail distribution, because of the data availability. Recent 
papers (Eeckhout, 2009; Levy, 2009) discuss that the behaviour of the upper-tail 
distribution can differ from that of the rest of the sample, because for the largest cities 
the lognormal tail and the Pareto tail of the distribution are hard to distinguish. 
Moreover, as Levy (2009) argues, while the upper tail in the US city size distribution in 
2000 includes only 6% of the cities, it accounts for almost 23% of the total US 
population. Therefore, a separate analysis for the largest cities is important.   
Table 3 shows the results of Pesaran’s test, both the value of the test statistic and 
the corresponding p-value, applied to the upper-tail distribution until the 500 largest 
cities in the initial period have been considered for all the decades. All the statistics are 
based on univariate AR(1) specifications including constant and trend. The null 
hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected in the US or Italy for any of the sample sizes 
considered, providing evidence in favour of the long-term validity of Gibrat’s law. 
Spain’s case is different, since when the sample size is more than the 200 largest cities 
the unit root is rejected. The analysis in the next section reveals that the reason for this 
9 Pesaran’s test performs well for a small T  and large N , but the power of the test decreases 
dramatically when, as in our case, N  is large and T  is small. The Monte Carlo results in Pesaran (2007) 
are in line with the theoretical findings of Moon et al. (2007), who show that local power of panel unit 
root tests is in the 141 ?? TN  neighbourhood of the null in the case of models with linear trends. In our 
case, with ??N  and 11?T , the power of the test would be almost zero if all cities were 
considered. 
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rejection is a positive relationship between the relative size and the growth rate for the 
largest cities. This result could be a consequence of the political regime, a military 
dictatorship in most decades of the century. In this context, although only for the capital 
city, Ades and Glaeser (1995) find that this city will tend to be more dominant the more 
political instability there is in a country and the more authoritarian is its regime. 
4.2. Nonparametric analysis: kernel regression conditional on city size 
Here we perform an analysis of the entire distribution, not just the upper tail. As 
a first approximation to city growth, Figure 2 shows the scatter plots of growth against 
city relative size for three representative decades (the behaviour in the rest of the 
adjacent periods is similar) in the US, Spain and Italy. These graphs seem to support 
that growth is independent of size, although they also point to a great variance across 
observations, especially in the case of the US. In this section, we analyse the 
relationship between growth and initial size using two different nonparametric tools. 
First, we perform a nonparametric analysis using kernel regressions as in 
Ioannides and Overman (2003) and Eeckhout (2004). It consists of taking the following 
specification: 
? ? iii smg ??? ,   (2) 
where ig  is the growth rate ? ?1lnln ?? itit ss  normalised (subtracting the contemporary 
mean and dividing by the standard deviation in the relevant decade) and is  is the 
logarithm of the ith city’s relative size. Instead of making assumptions about the 
functional relationship m , ? ?smˆ  is estimated as a local mean around the point s  and is 
smoothed using a kernel, which is a symmetrical, weighted and continuous function in 
s .
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To estimate ? ?smˆ , the Nadaraya–Watson method is used, exactly as it appears in 
























ˆ ,  (3) 
where hK  denotes the dependence of the kernel K  (in this case an Epanechnikov) on 
the bandwidth h . We use the same bandwidth (0.5) in all the estimations to permit 
comparisons between countries. 
Starting from this calculated mean ? ?smˆ , the variance of the growth rate ig  is 
also estimated, again by applying the Nadaraya–Watson estimator: 
? ?
























?ˆ . (4) 
The estimator is very sensitive, both in mean and in variance, to atypical values. 
Eeckhout (2004) finds that some outliers have a huge impact on the variance of growth 
rates. For this reason, in the same way as Eeckhout (2004), we eliminate from the 
sample some atypical observations: the 5% of smallest cities because they usually have 
much higher growth rates in mean and variance. This is logical; these are cities of under 
200 inhabitants, where the smallest increase in population is very large in percentage 
terms. 
Following Gabaix and Ioannides (2004), “Gibrat’s law states that the growth 
rate of an economic entity (firm, mutual fund, city) of size S  has a distribution function 
                                                 
10 The calculation was performed with the KERNREG2 Stata module, developed by Cox, Salgado-
Ugarte, Shimizu and Taniuchi, and available online at: http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s372601.html.
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with mean and variance that are independent of S ”. Thus, they distinguish between 
Gibrat’s law for means and Gibrat’s law for variances. As the growth rates are 
normalised, if Gibrat’s law in mean is strictly fulfilled, the nonparametric estimate will 
be a straight line on the zero value. Values different from zero involve deviations from 
the mean. Moreover, the estimated variance of the growth rate will also be a straight 
line on the value one, which would mean that the variance does not depend on the size 
of the city. To be able to test these hypotheses, we construct bootstrapped 95% 
confidence bands (calculated from 500 random samples with replacements). 
We offer a first approach to the behaviour of city growth from a short-term 
perspective, i.e., considering each decade individually. Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the 
nonparametric estimates for the US, Spain and Italy, respectively, corresponding to the 
same three representative decades shown in Figure 2. 
Two different behaviours can be observed; while in the US the estimate of 
growth is very close to the zero value (this value falls within the confidence bands for 
most of the distributions, supporting Gibrat’s law even in the short term), in Spain and 
Italy a different pattern of growth can be seen. Starting from the beginning of the 
century until the mid-century, the city growth exhibits clear divergent behaviour in both 
European countries, although Gibrat’s law can only be rejected for some values at the 
upper-tail distribution. However, in the second half of the century the growth changes 
gradually to an inverted U-shaped pattern. These results confirm that, as Gabaix and 
Ioannides (2004) indicate, “the casual impression of the authors is that in some 
decades, large cities grow faster than small cities, but in other decades, small cities 
grow faster”.
There is a negative relationship between the estimated variance of growth and 
city size in the three countries for most of the decades (this is especially true for the US, 
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where Gibrat’s law can be rejected at the upper tail), although in Spain and Italy the 
behaviour of the variance is irregular, particularly in the first decades of the century. 
Moreover, to analyse the entire twentieth century, we build a pool with all the 
growth rates between two consecutive periods. This enables us to carry out long-term 
analysis. Figure 6 shows the nonparametric estimates of the growth rate of a pool for the 
entire twentieth century for the US (1900–2000, 152,475 observations), Spain (1900–
2001, 74,100 observations) and Italy (1901–2001, 73,260 observations). For the US, the 
value zero is always in the confidence bands, so that the growth rates being significantly 
different for any city size cannot be rejected. For Spain and Italy, the estimated mean 
grows with the sample size, although it is significantly different from zero only for the 
largest cities. One possible explanation is historical: both Spain and Italy suffered wars 
on their territories during the twentieth century, so that for several decades the largest 
cities attracted most of the population.11 However, the estimations by decade indicate 
that this tendency would have reversed in the second half of the century. Therefore, we 
find evidence in favour of Gibrat’s law for means for the US throughout the twentieth 
century. Support is weaker in Spain and Italy because the largest cities show some 
divergent behaviour.
Figure 6 also shows the nonparametric estimates of the variance of growth rates 
of a pool for the entire twentieth century for the US, Spain and Italy. As expected, while 
for most of the distribution the value one falls within the confidence bands, indicating 
that there are no significant differences in variance, the tails of the distribution show 
differentiated behaviours. In the US, the variance clearly decreases with the size of the 
city, while in Spain and Italy the behaviour is more erratic and the biggest cities also 
have high variances.
                                                 
11 This result could be related to the “safe harbour effect” of Glaeser and Shapiro (2002), which is a 
centripetal force that tends to agglomerate the populations in large cities when there is an armed conflict. 
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Our results, obtained with a sample of all incorporated places without any size 
restriction, are similar to those obtained by Ioannides and Overman (2003), with their 
database of MSAs. To sum up, the nonparametric estimates (Figure 6) show that while 
the mean of growth (Gibrat’s law for means) seems to be independent of size in the 
three countries in the long term (although in Spain and Italy the largest cities present 
some divergent behaviour), the variance of growth (Gibrat’s law for variances) depends 
negatively on size: the smallest cities present clearly higher variances in all three 
countries (although in Spain and Italy the behaviour is more erratic). In the short term 
(Figures 3, 4 and 5), the evidence supporting Gibrat’s law is weaker, as it corresponds 
to a law that is thought to hold mainly in the long term (Gabaix and Ioannides, 2004). 
This points to Gibrat’s law holding weakly (growth is proportional in means but not in 
variance).12
Finally, as González-Val (2012), we perform a nonparametric estimation of 
growth using a resistant smoothing approach. Kernel estimation of regression functions 
has been receiving a great deal of attention in the recent literature examining Gibrat’s 
law (Ioannides and Overman, 2003; Eeckhout, 2004; González-Val, 2010; Giesen and 
Südekum, 2011) and the most widely used estimator is the Nadaraya–Watson estimator. 
Thus, the previous results can be compared with those of other studies. However, as 
argued before, the Nadaraya–Watson estimator is known to be highly sensitive to the 
presence of outliers in the data, so we have to exclude some observations. 
Now, we try to reduce this sensitivity by using a resistant smoothing technique, 
the LOcally WEighted Scatter plot Smoothing (LOWESS) algorithm, proposed by 
                                                 
12 Although our results support Gibrat’s law only partially, there are theoretical models that explain how 
growth can be proportional in means but not in variance. Gabaix (1999) contemplates the possibility that 
Gibrat’s law might not hold exactly, and examines the case in which cities grow randomly with expected 
growth rates and standard deviations that depend on their sizes. Córdoba (2008) also introduces a 
parsimonious generalisation of Gibrat’s law that allows size to affect the variance of the growth process 
but not its mean. 
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Cleveland (1979). It is based on local polynomial fits; see Härdle (1990, Chapter 6). 
The advantages of LOWESS are that it is a free-functional form method13 and that it is 
robust to atypical values. Therefore, it allows us to obtain robust nonparametric 
estimates of growth and variance, using the entire sample, including the smallest 5% of 
distribution observations, which we previously excluded. Figure 7 shows the results for 
the twentieth-century pool of observations for the US, Spain and Italy (this figure is 
analogous to Figure 6, but includes the smallest 5% of observations).14 Their inclusion 
produces an increase in the estimates of both growth and variance at the lower tail of the 
distribution; this increment is much greater in the case of variance, as the dispersion of 
these observations is very high. Thus, small cities exhibit higher growth (except for the 
case of Italy) and variance than the rest of the cities, indicating again that Gibrat’s law 
does not hold exactly. 
For the rest of the sample, the results estimated by LOWESS are very similar to 
those estimated by the Nadaraya–Watson estimator, both in growth and in variance 
(Figure 6). This is logical because the Nadaraya–Watson estimator estimates a local 
mean around each point of the grid, so the estimates for the medium-size cities or the 
upper-tail distribution do not depend on the values of the smallest observations, 
indicating that our previous results excluding the smallest 5% of observations are robust 
for most of the distribution. Their inclusion only increases growth and variance at the 
lower tail of the distribution. 
                                                 
13 It does not require the specification of a function to fit a model to all of the data in the sample; 
LOWESS simply carries out a locally weighted regression of the y variable on the x variable, obtaining a 
new smoothed variable. We use the lowess command in STATA with the default options: a smoothing 
parameter equal to 0.8 and a tricube weighting function. 
14 Estimates by decade, not shown, are available from the authors on request. 
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5. What about city size distribution? 
Proportionate growth implies a lognormal distribution, and this is a statistical 
relationship (Gibrat, 1931; Kalecki, 1945). However, if there is a lower bound to the 
distribution (which can be very low) the resulting distribution is Pareto (Gabaix, 1999), 
so, as Eeckhout (2004) shows, city size distribution follows a lognormal distribution 
only when we consider all cities without any size restriction.15 Our results show that the 
growth process leads to a lognormal distribution with standard deviation that increases 
in time t  in the three countries if all cities are considered. This is result theoretically 
predicted: under a Brownian motion (Gabaix, 1999; Ioannides and Overman, 2003), the 
sample standard deviation should increase with the passing of time as a function of t
(Anderson and Ge, 2005). Furthermore, it can be shown that by introducing a small 
change in one of the assumptions in Kalecki’s classic model,16 the same standard 
framework can be obtained, combining lognormality with a variance that increases in 
time. 
We carried out Wilcoxon’s lognormality test (rank-sum test), which is a 
nonparametric test for assessing whether two samples of observations come from the 
same distribution. The null hypothesis is that the two samples are drawn from a single 
population and, therefore, that their probability distributions are equal, in our case, the 
lognormal distribution. Wilcoxon’s test has the advantage of being appropriate for any 
sample size. The more frequent normality tests – Kolmogorov–Smirnov, Shapiro–
Wilks, D’Agostino–Pearson – are designed for small samples and so tend to reject the 
null hypothesis of normality for large sample sizes, although the deviations from 
lognormality are arbitrarily small. 
                                                 
15 We acknowledge one anonymous referee for this comment. 
16 Just changing Equation (2) of Kalecki (1945), making 0??Yy .
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Table 4 shows the results of the test. The conclusion is that the null hypothesis 
of lognormality cannot be rejected at 5% for all the periods of the twentieth century in 
Spain and Italy. In the US, a temporal evolution can be observed; in the first decades, 
lognormality is rejected and the p-value decreases over time, but from 1930 the p-value 
begins to grow until lognormal distribution is not rejected at 5% from 1960 onwards. In 
fact, if instead of 5% we take a significance level of 1%, the null hypothesis would only 
be rejected in 1920 and 1930. 
However, the shape of the distribution in the US for the period 1900–1950 is not 
far from lognormality either. Figure 8 shows the empirical density functions estimated 
by adaptive Gaussian kernels for 1900, 1950 (the last year in which lognormality is 
rejected at 5%) and 2000. The motive for this systematic rejection seems to be an 
excessive concentration of density in the central values that is higher than would 
correspond to the theoretical lognormal distribution (dotted line). Starting in 1900 with 
a very leptokurtic distribution with a great deal of density concentrated in the mean 
value, from 1930 (not shown), when the growth of the urban population slows, the 
distribution loses kurtosis and the concentration decreases, not rejecting lognormality 
statistically at 5% from 1960. 
To sum up, both the test carried out and the visualisation of the estimated 
empirical density functions seem to corroborate that city size distribution can be 
approximated correctly as lognormal (in Spain and Italy for the entire twentieth century 
and in the US for most decades, depending on the significance level). 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this work is simple: to provide additional information on whether 
Gibrat’s law, an empirical regularity that is well-known in the literature on urban 
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economics, holds. Briefly, this law states that the population growth rate of cities is a 
process deriving from independent multiplicative shocks, which implies two statistical 
conclusions. First, the empirical city size distribution can be well fitted by a lognormal; 
second, the growth rate is on average independent of the initial size of the urban centres 
and its evolution is fundamentally stochastic without any fixed pattern of behaviour. 
Moreover, although this issue is not dealt with here, if the urban growth process follows 
Gibrat’s law, this has some theoretical implications (see the survey by Gabaix and 
Ioannides, 2004). 
This article contributes in several ways. On the one hand, it uses a database 
covering un-truncated settlement size data from three countries (the US, Spain and 
Italy) with different urban histories, over a long time span (the entire twentieth century). 
As far as we know, this is the widest-ranging attempt to test the geographical and 
temporal validity of this law, focusing on robust results. On the other hand, it employs 
different methods (parametric and nonparametric). 
There are two basic conclusions. First, the panel data unit root tests carried out 
confirm that, in the long term, Gibrat’s law always holds for the upper-tail of the 
distribution for the US and Italy, and only for the 200 largest cities for Spain. In any 
case, the use of panel techniques for three countries and eleven census periods is 
innovative. However, from the use of nonparametric techniques considering all the 
cities, also over the long term, such as kernel regressions conditional on city size, we 
deduce that Gibrat’s law does not hold exactly for the whole distribution. Gibrat’s law 
for means seems to hold for the US and, to a lesser extent, for Spain and Italy. In these 
two European countries, there is a positive relationship between city size and growth, 
although this divergent behaviour is only significant for the largest cities. Nevertheless, 
we also find that, in general, the variances depend negatively on size, pointing to a weak 
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version of Gibrat’s law where growth is proportional in means but not in variance. 
Moreover, small cities clearly exhibit higher growth (except for the case of Italy) and 
variance than the rest of the cities, even when we estimate using a nonparametric 
resistant smoothing approach. In the short term, as could be anticipated, the evidence 
regarding the validity of the law is more mixed. 
Second, the lognormal distribution works well as a description of empirical city 
size distributions across the entire century when no truncation point is considered. 
Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test shows that, except for the US in the first half of the century, 
the lognormal distribution can never be rejected. 
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Table 1. Empirical Studies on Gibrat’s Law. A Survey 
Study Country Period Truncation point Sample size GL EcIss 
Eaton and Eckstein (1997) France and Japan 1876–1990 (F) 1925–1985 (J)
Cities > 50,000 inhabitants (F) 
Cities > 250,000 inhabitants (J) 39 (F), 40 (J) A par (gr reg); non par (tr mat, lz) 
Davis and Weinstein (2002) Japan 1925–1965 Cities > 30,000 inhabitants 303 A par (purt) 
Bosker et al. (2008) West Germany 1925–1999 Cities > 50,000 inhabitants 62 M par (purt); non par (ker) 
Giesen and Südekum (2011) West Germany 1975–1997 Cities > 100,000 inhabitants 71 A non par (ker) 
Brakman et al. (2004) Germany 1946–1963 Cities > 50,000 inhabitants 103 A par (purt) 
Clark and Stabler (1991) Canada 1975–1984 Seven most populous cities 7 A par (purt) 
Resende (2004) Brazil 1980–2000 Cities > 1,000 inhabitants 497 A par (purt) 
Eeckhout (2004) US 1990–2000 All cities 19,361 A par (gr reg); non par (ker) 
Ioannides and Overman (2003) US 1900–1990 All MSAs 112 (1900) to 334 (1990) A non par (ker)
Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) US 1900–1990 All MSAs 112 (1900) to 334 (1990) A non par (ker) 
Black and Henderson (2003) US 1900–1990 All MSAs 194 (1900) to 282 (1990) R par (purt) 
González-Val (2010) US 1900–2000 All cities 10,596 to 19,296 A non par (ker) 
Michaels et al. (2012) US 1880–2000 Minor Civil Divisions & counties 10,864 M non par (dsf) 
Guérin-Pace (1995) France 1836–1990 Cities > 2,000 inhabitants 675 (1836) to 1782 (1990) R par (corr) 
Soo (2007) Malaysia 1957–2000 Urban areas > 10,000 inhabitants 44 (1957) to 171 (2000) R par (purt) 
Petrakos et al. (2000) Greece 1981–1991 Urban centres > 5,000 inhabitants 150 R par (gr reg) 
Henderson and Wang (2007) World 1960–2000 Metro areas > 100,000 inhabitants 1,220 (1960) to 1,644 (2000) R par (purt) 
Anderson and Ge (2005) China 1961–1999 Cities > 100,000 inhabitants 149 M par (rank reg); non par (tr mat) 
Gibrat’s Law: GL EcIss: Econometric Issues       gr reg: growth regressions    corr: coefficient of correlation (Pearson) 
A: Accepted par: parametric methods       ker: kernel regressions    lz: Lorenz curves   
R: Rejected non par: non parametric methods       rank reg: rank regressions    dsf: discrete-step function   
M: Mixed Results purt: panel unit root tests       tr mat: transition matrices     
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Table 2. Number of Cities and Descriptive Statistics by Year and Country 
US             
Year Cities Mean 
Standard 




CP in our 
sample 
1900 10,596 3,376.04 42,323.90 7 3,437,202 76,212,168 46.9 
1910 14,135 3,560.92 49,351.24 4 4,766,883 92,228,496 54.6 
1920 15,481 4,014.81 56,781.65 3 5,620,048 106,021,537 58.6 
1930 16,475 4,642.02 67,853.65 1 6,930,446 123,202,624 62.1 
1940 16,729 4,975.67 71,299.37 1 7,454,995 132,164,569 63.0 
1950 17,113 5,613.42 76,064.40 1 7,891,957 151,325,798 63.5 
1960 18,051 6,408.75 74,737.62 1 7,781,984 179,323,175 64.5 
1970 18,488 7,094.29 75,319.59 3 7,894,862 203,302,031 64.5 
1980 18,923 7,395.64 69,167.91 2 7,071,639 226,542,199 61.8 
1990 19,120 7,977.63 71,873.91 2 7,322,564 248,709,873 61.3 
2000 19,296 8,968.44 78,014.75 1 8,008,278 281,421,906 61.5 
Spain               
Year Cities Mean 
Standard 




CP in our 
sample 
1900 7,800 2,282.40 10,177.75 78 539,835 18,616,630 95.6 
1910 7,806 2,452.01 11,217.02 92 599,807 19,990,669 95.7 
1920 7,812 2,621.92 13,501.02 82 750,896 21,388,551 95.8 
1930 7,875 2,892.18 17,513.90 79 1,005,565 23,677,095 96.2 
1940 7,896 3,180.65 20,099.96 11 1,088,647 26,014,278 96.5 
1950 7,901 3,479.86 26,033.29 64 1,618,435 28,117,873 97.8 
1960 7,910 3,801.71 33,652.11 51 2,259,931 30,582,936 98.3 
1970 7,956 4,240.98 43,971.93 10 3,146,071 33,956,047 99.4 
1981 8,034 4,701.40 45,995.35 5 3,188,297 37,742,561 100.0 
1991 8,077 4,882.27 45,219.85 2 3,084,673 39,433,942 100.0 
2001 8,077 5,039.37 43,079.46 7 2,938,723 40,847,371 99.6 
Italy               
Year Cities Mean 
Standard 




CP in our 
sample 
1901 7,711 4,274.84 14,424.61 56 621,213 32,963,000 100.0 
1911 7,711 4,648.11 17,392.98 58 751,211 35,842,000 100.0 
1921 8,100 4,863.80 20,031.61 58 859,629 39,397,000 100.0 
1931 8,100 5,067.10 22,559.85 93 960,660 41,043,000 100.0 
1936 8,100 5,234.38 25,274.48 116 1,150,338 42,398,000 100.0 
1951 8,100 5,866.12 31,137.52 74 1,651,393 47,516,000 100.0 
1961 8,100 6,249.82 39,130.55 90 2,187,682 50,624,000 100.0 
1971 8,100 6,683.52 45,581.66 51 2,781,385 54,137,000 100.0 
1981 8,100 6,982.33 45,329.33 32 2,839,638 56,557,000 100.0 
1991 8,100 7,009.63 42,450.26 31 2,775,250 56,778,000 100.0 
2001 8,100 7,021.20 39,325.47 33 2,546,804 56,996,000 99.8 
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Table 3. Panel Unit Root Tests, Pesaran’s CADF Statistic 
Cities (N) US Spain Italy 
50 –0.488 (0.313) –0.915 (0.180) 4.995 (0.999) 
100 0.753 (0.774) 0.050 (0.520) 5.983 (0.999) 
200 1.618 (0.947) –2.866 (0.002) –1.097 (0.136) 
500 1.034 (0.849) –12.132 (0.000) 5.832 (0.999) 
Notes: test-statistic (p-value). Pesaran’s CADF test: standardised Ztbar statistic, ? ?tZ . Variable: Relative size (in natural logarithms), sample 
size: (N, 11).
Table 4. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test of Lognormality by Year and Country 
US
Year 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
p-value 0.0252 0.017 0.0078 0.0088 0.0208 0.0464 0.1281 0.1836 0.2538 0.323 0.4168 
Spain
Year 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1981 1991 2001 
p-value 0.5953 0.6144 0.6233 0.6525 0.4909 0.5792 0.6049 0.522 0.5176 0.622 0.7212 
Italy
Year 1901 1911 1921 1931 1936 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 
p-value 0.2081 0.2205 0.2352 0.291 0.2864 0.3118 0.2589 0.272 0.382 0.4671 0.5287 
Ho: The distribution of cities follows a lognormal
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1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Initial Year
US Spain Italy
Note: Average growth rates weighted by city size. 
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Figure 8. Estimated Density Function (ln scale) and the Theoretical Lognormal (dotted line) for the US in 1900, 1950 and 2000 
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